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Antinomies of Globalization 
Introduction: Refusing the forced choice 
Today, we are told that globalism, or more precisely neoliberal 
internationalism, is in crisis. The most important symptom of this crisis is the 
rise of populist forms of nationalism (see, e.g., the MGDR review piece on 
populism by Gökmen 2017). For any enlightened “secular” subject, the 
choice between these two options must be clear: Given the racism, 
ethnicism, chauvinism, sexism or climate denialism of many of the 
nationalist populist options (think about Trump in US, Farage in UK, Le Pen 
in France, and so on), even though the economics of neoliberal 
internationalism has been detrimental in terms of economic injustice and 
ecological disaster, we should bite the bullet and vote for the “centrist” 
neoliberal option (Clinton, Remain, Macron, etc.). Nevertheless, one must 
refuse this forced choice (which has the structure of “your life or your 
money”) and recast the terms of the debate in a manner that opens up the 
field to other paths to be explored and taken.1 The aim of this brief note is 
to interrogate and deconstruct some seemingly intractable and hardened 
antinomies of our times, explore how they may be implicated in and 
constituted by each other’s presence, and trace the underlying semantic 
matrix that governs the relations among the terms in a complexly and 
unstable network.2 Once these hardened antinomies are pulverized into 
overdetermined contradictions, it will be possible to offer a re-configuration 
of the organizing problematic that structures and imposes limits to the public 
debate on how to govern social reproduction.  
                                                 
1  In an op-ed prior to the election, Slavoj Zizek (2017) calls this a “false choice” whereas I 
prefer to read it as a “forced choice” as not choosing the neoliberal internationalist option 
implies a certain symbolic death in the eyes of the globalist “common sense”. 
2 Marxian theorist Fredric Jameson (1994) defines antinomy by distinguishing it from 
contradiction. While the two opposing propositions that make up an antinomy are “radically, 
or absolutely, incompatible,” the contradiction “is a matter of partialities and aspects; only 
some of it is incompatible with the accompanying proposition” (2). While antinomies are 
frozen and resist dialecticization, contradictions are productive; they lend themselves to 
mediation, movement, and transformation. Jameson, rather than choosing between the 
two, proposes a layered model where antinomies are symptoms of underlying 
contradictions. Let me also note that Jameson, in distinguishing antinomy from 
contradiction suppresses another, and according Louis Althusser (1965), properly Marxist 
concept of overdetermination. This third concept of causality indicates that every 
conjuncture, site or process is a concatenated and unstable unity of contradictions. In this 
short note, antinomies will be contaminated and pulled apart towards tracing their 
overdetermination; in this manner, their ambivalences will be teased out. 
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The defining antinomy of our post-2008 crash phase, as the forced 
choice described above suggests, is argued to be the one between 
neoliberalism and populism. But again as the forced choice above 
demonstrates, this antinomy is easily grafted onto another, older antinomy 
between internationalism and nationalism. Older, because implicitly 
underlying this second antinomy is one between free trade and 
protectionism — the history of which can be traced to the early periods of 
capitalism. During the first half of the nineteenth century, in a controversy 
known as the Corn Law debates, a late-mercantilist configuration of nation-
state-capital triad in England insisted on the protection of capitalist 
agriculture, whereas the emergent industrial bourgeoisie demanded free 
trade. In this foundational debate of classical political economy, Reverend 
Thomas Malthus, taking a nationalist position, pushed for the protection of 
domestic farmers and landed aristocracy. In contrast, David Ricardo, based 
on his own theory of comparative advantage, argued that free trade would 
be beneficial not only for Britain but also for every other trading nation. This 
deep running division, in turn, summons another antinomy between 
globalization and imperialism. This last antinomy is invoked not only 
because the nationalist-populist pole tends to mobilize anti-imperialist 
rhetoric and arguments against what neoliberal internationalists champion 
as the inevitable historical march of globalization, but also because the latter 
camp deploys it in order to assert the superior economic efficiency of free-
trade over the inefficiencies of inter-imperialist rivalries (protectionism, 
conflicts, wars, etc.) and therefore the historical necessity and inevitability 
of world peace under a world market. Table 1, following the Jameson 
suggestion, layers the three primary antimonies discussed so far. 
Table 1: A Layering of Antimonies 
Neoliberalism Populism 
Internationalism Nationalism 
Globalization (Anti-)Imperialism 
In order to refuse the forced choice imposed on us by such alignment 
of these antinomies, the card-deck must be re-shuffled so that a more 
complex and distributed mapping of the relation among these terms can be 
discerned. Needless to say, as the terms of the antinomies are interrogated 
and reorganized in new combinations, antinomies will proliferate 
polysemically: imperialism vs. internationalism, liberalism vs. socialism, 
democracy vs. authoritarianism, laissez faire vs. planning, market vs. state, 
global vs. local, early vs. late globalization (see, e.g., Turcan 2016), (late) 
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capitalism vs. post-capitalism, and finally, populism vs. counter-populism. 
And in fact, it would be possible to begin our investigation from any one of 
these antinomies – as each and every one of them and others that one can 
conjure up are equally relevant and meaningful points of departure. 
However, because the three antinomies that line-up as the two poles of the 
forced choice is the one that our historical conjuncture serves us, we will 
take them as our entry point and explore the other antinomies as the 
relations among the terms of the three antinomies are interrogated and 
reconfigured. 
Internationalism: Neoliberal or anti-imperialist? 
Let us begin with the alignment of internationalism with neoliberalism. 
Without doubt, the so-called marketization (privatization of publicly-owned 
enterprises, rolling back of welfare transfers) and (trade and financial) 
liberalization policies that are associated with neoliberalism have indeed 
contributed to the internationalization of the world economy — both by 
reconfiguring the role of the nation-state and by increasing the flow of 
commodities and values across countries. In this sense, there is indeed an 
internationalist strain to neoliberalism. Or, to put it differently, neoliberal 
reason has historically pushed for the increased freedom of movement of 
capital and commodities (but not necessarily humans). 
But this lining up of internationalism and neoliberalism must be 
problematized. First, internationalism, as announced forcefully with the 
rallying cry, “Workers of the World, Unite!” in Marx and Engels’ Communist 
Manifesto (1848) and institutionalized in the First (1864-1876) and the 
Second Internationals (1889-1916), has also been historically an anti-
capitalist and anti-imperialist ideology. In this regard, Marx’s own take on 
the Corn Law debates is worth recalling: Assessing the potential 
consequences of both protectionism and free-trade on the conditions of 
working people, Marx (1962[1848]) argued that, despite the fact that a free-
trade policy does not necessarily improve their lot, working people should 
side with the free-trade internationalist as the internationalization of capital 
would eliminate the feudal remnants and clarify the battle lines between the 
capitalist classes and the working people. In this version of internationalism, 
Marx appears to be endorsing Ricardo’s view of capitalism as a 
revolutionizing force but for diametrically opposite reasons. 
Nevertheless, the relation between internationalism and nationalism, 
precisely because of the persistence of imperialism, has been a very difficult 
question for the socialists and communists as they have historically been 
caught in between the 1914-1945 debacle of two World Wars interspersed 
with the Great Depression, on the one hand, and the wave of anti-colonialist 
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nationalist liberation revolutions across the world in the second half of the 
twentieth century on the other (Chatterjee 2012; Nairn 1997). In 1914, the 
anti-imperialist internationalism of Second International fell into a tragic 
crisis when the social democrats and socialists of the Great Powers voted 
for the war decision in their respective parliaments. This experience, 
combined with the October Revolution in Russia and Lenin’s formulation of 
The Right of the Nations for Self-determination, have led the left to split 
nationalism into two. Nationalism as the ideology of imperialist Great 
Powers was rejected as a chauvinism that obscured the fact that imperialist 
wars and colonial interventions, waged in the name of securing the 
conditions of existence of the accumulation of surplus value, were against 
the class interests of the working people (Lenin 1973[1917]). In contrast, 
anti-colonialist nationalism was endorsed as the self-defense of the 
colonized people against an Empire that was always compelled to 
incorporate newer non-capitalist (colonial) territories into its domain not only 
to exploit their resources but also to use them as fresh markets for selling 
both consumer and capital goods (Luxemburg 1972[1921]). Interestingly, of 
course, some of the erstwhile colonies – now free to pursue their national 
interests – are now offering strong international competition to the workers 
of the advanced capitalist nations, again forcing workers on each side to 
choose between the devil and the deep blue sea. 
Nationalism: Good and Bad 
Therefore, both internationalism and nationalism are split categories. There 
are neoliberal as well as progressive internationalisms. Similarly, there are 
imperialist as well as anti-colonialist nationalisms. Nevertheless, even this 
division is far from stable. On the one hand, throughout its century long 
history, many Marxists have been very critical about Soviet Union’s 
instrumentalization of “internationalism” in the name of its own “social-
imperialist” designs (e.g., Eastern Europe, Afghanistan). On the other hand, 
if we were to recall the Bandung conference and its principles, Third World 
nationalism turned out to be a much more authentically inter-nationalist 
program than the Cold-War neo-imperialism of Pax-Americana. In 1955, the 
Bandung Conference brought together many of the then newly-independent 
Asian and African states and as its central tenet foregrounded peaceful 
coexistence among equal sovereign nation-states. In the words of President 
Sukarno (of Indonesia), the host of the conference, the aim was to inject 
“the voice of reason into world affairs” (cf. Chatterjee 2012, p. 11). In 
contrast, Pax-Americana persistently meant wars, conflicts, and 
interventions (e.g., Korean War, Cuba, Vietnam War, Chile, Iran).  
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Within this anti-colonialist Bandung rubric, we can also identify the 
progressive economic character of postwar developmental nationalism.  
Squarely situated within the Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm that 
takes the nation-state as the unit of its analysis, versions of post-war 
developmental governmentality conceptualized development as a means of 
emancipation from — depending on the particular third world context — 
backwardness, stagnation, underdevelopment, dependency, 
neocolonialism or unequal exchange; and conceived of economic 
development as a national project.3 “Nationalism,” writes Tom Nairn, “was 
the effort by one ‘backward’ culture and people after another to appropriate 
the powers and benefits of modernity for their own use” (1993, p. 71). 
Of course, the distinctive feature of our modernity has been the 
process of capitalist accumulation and its internationalizing tendencies. 
Nationalism figures in, among its other ideological functions, as a social 
frame to harness and appropriate the powers and benefits of capitalist 
growth. Yet, this figuration of nationalism – where modernity is represented 
as a neutral tool and the nation-form refers to a unified people – covers up 
over two constitutive and interconnected economic cleavages. These are 
the proper “exploitation” cleavage within the nation and the “unequal 
exchange” cleavage among the nations. The former cleavage designates a 
set of “class differences” among those who produce, appropriate, distribute 
or receive surplus value within a nation. The latter cleavage, on the other 
hand, designates a hierarchy of nations ranging from those that reap the 
benefits of the movement of capital (core, center, metropolis) to those that 
need to defend and pull themselves from being the victims or objects of 
capital (periphery, satellite; see Dholakia 2018 for a discussion invoking the 
powerfully simple center-periphery model of Galtung 1980). Without doubt, 
these two cleavages intersect with each other, forming a matrix of 
interconnected problems and antagonisms (Dholakia 2018). For instance, 
all nations, whether they be core, semi-periphery, or periphery, are multiply 
cleaved by class differences and exposed to the destabilizing effects of 
class antagonism.  
It is thus necessary to invent institutions and discourses that allow 
class conflict to be subordinated to a relatively effective, durable, and 
“equitable” “general interest.” This allows us to understand in 
particular why projects of national construction, consequently 
                                                 
3 That is, until the neoliberal revolution of 1980s when they are replaced by the highly 
myopic balance of payments national accounting framework on the macro side and the 
symptom-level interventionism of “poor economics” on the micro side. For a recent survey 
of this trajectory, see Akbulut, Adaman and Madra 2015.   
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nationalist ideologies in the modern age, have such difficulty 
presenting themselves as something other than either imperialist or 
anti-imperialist programs, a way to establish or tear down hegemony. 
If there is no monopoly to defend or conquer, there can be no state; 
and if there is no state, there can be no nation (Balibar 2004, pp. 18-
9). 
Nevertheless, the nationalist vernacular that is supposed to 
domesticate and manage the class antagonism will always be deployed in 
a differential manner, depending on a given nation’s relative position within 
the hierarchy of nations. And it is precisely depending how the nationalist 
vernacular is deployed and depending on the given social composition and 
direction of the popular class alliance that is being forged, a nationalism can 
either be aggressive, chauvinist, imperialist and colonialist; or, conversely, 
self-defensive, progressive, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist. Notice that 
while trying to deconstruct one antinomy (internationalism vs. nationalism), 
we found ourselves entangled in another one (imperialist vs. anti-imperialist 
nationalism). Trying to break the alignment between neoliberalism and 
internationalism, we unpacked the problem of internationalism by theorizing 
the hierarchies among and within nation-states, without sufficiently 
problematizing the historical articulation of neoliberalism with the 
institutional form of nation-state. Let us now turn our attention to this 
question. 
Neoliberal State and Nation 
The alignment between neoliberalism and internationalism can be 
destabilized from the perspective of neoliberalism as well: Neoliberalism is 
neither inherently anti-statist nor internationalist.  Historically (and for some 
of its strains, theoretically) neoliberalism, contrary to what its numerous 
advocates and detractors alike tend to argue, did not entail the rolling back 
of the state — rather it entailed an epochal reconfiguration of its relation to 
its subjects (for a recent view from the periphery, see Gago 2017). In 
contrast to the post-WWII welfare states of advanced capitalist social 
formations and the developmental state of the Third World, the neoliberal 
state does not treat its subjects as citizens but rather as consumers or 
entrepreneurs (Foucault 2008). In other words, even though “small state” 
has been a rallying cry of the neoliberal revolution, the historical record 
shows that the nation-states, far from shrinking, have become more 
involved in regulating and governing the social field—albeit through 
mechanisms of control. In fact, this is precisely what distinguishes 
neoliberalism from classical liberalism: While the latter, at least ideologically 
speaking, aimed at protecting the autonomy of civil society and the markets 
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from the interventions of a mercantilist state, the neoliberal counter-
revolution aimed at transforming the welfare state by submitting its functions 
to an audit of economic efficiency and performance (see also, Özgün, 
Dholakia and Atik 2017). Without doubt, there is a world of difference 
between the mercantilist state and the welfare state. While the former was 
a capitalist nation-state still in-formation, the latter is a state that has been 
forged out of a century-long class struggle and the two world wars. The 
welfare state has already and irreversibly extended its reach beyond market 
maintenance (protection of private property, antitrust regulation) all the way 
into the depths of social reproduction: education, health care, 
unemployment insurance, childcare, social security, and so on. In that 
regard, a quick look at the topics discussed in Milton Friedman’s Capitalism 
and Freedom (fiscal policy, education, discrimination, occupational 
licensure, income distribution, social welfare, and poverty) will demonstrate 
that the aim of neoliberal counter-revolution is to reconfigure all these 
functions of the modern welfare state (governmentality) around the 
assumption that human beings respond to economic incentives.4 
All of which explains the persistence of the state under neoliberalism, 
but not the persistence of the nation. Yet, perhaps except for European 
Union — and even in this case, as the recent case of Brexit demonstrated, 
by fits and starts — the nation-form and nationalism have not only survived 
the decades of neoliberal internationalism but re-emerged in the form of the 
nation qua brand (Aronczyk 2013, Kaneva 2011). Neoliberal thought 
conceptualizes the international sphere as a competitive realm within which 
each nation-state competes with one another. The nationhood is turned into 
a corporate brand that functions as a platform for the ecology of national 
industries and sectors, promoted through public-private partnership 
schemes. Turkey presents a relevant example in this context even though 
it is far from being the most successful one. Since the early 1990s, Turkey, 
like many other nation-states, has been trying to cultivate a discourse of 
nationality as a global brand by positioning, in particular, Istanbul as a 
cultural, financial and transportation hub (Keyder 1999). One could arguably 
claim that this is a “good” kind of nationalism, one that is competing in a 
world market, rather than waging wars. Yet, there is, of course, a dark side 
                                                 
4 The specific focus of this paper prevents me from differentiating among forms of 
neoliberal reason with respect to their respective positions on the uses and limitations of 
markets. For instance, there is a world of difference between Milton Friedman’s vision of 
capitalism and freedom and Joseph Stiglitz’s vision of market socialism, even if both visions 
are premised upon the working assumption that human beings comprehend and respond 
predictably to economic incentives. For a discussion of forms of neoliberal reason, see 
(Madra and Adaman 2014). 
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to this kind of corporate nationalism as well. Consider, for instance, the 
urban displacement and gentrification caused by the production of Istanbul 
as the European Cultural Capital in 2010. Or, consider the disastrous 
ecological impact of the third airport (and its associated third bridge across 
the Bosporus as well as the connecting thruways) that is being built on the 
northern forests of Istanbul in order to position Turkish Airlines as the 
locomotive of brand Turkey (Paker 2017). This should not come as a 
surprise given that the idea of “national interests,” especially in neoliberal 
times, does not only suppress the interests of the local, the dispossessed 
and the disempowered but is also a decisively anthropocentric notion that 
defines itself against the backdrop of an utterly exploitable Earth. 
The persistence of the nation-state as an economic actor – despite 
the decades of neoliberal counter-revolution – can also be explained by its 
increasing role in managing the articulation of the national capital with the 
international economic order. Throughout the neoliberal decades, again 
despite the strong anti-state rhetoric, what we observed was a growing 
emphasis on the strategic capacities of nation-states to promote and 
enhance national competitiveness in an increasingly internationalized world 
economy. According to this Schumpeterian vision, the nation-state can 
function as a central organizing agency that coordinates the allocation of 
resources to promote technological, organizational and product innovation 
in order to enhance the structural competitiveness of the nation — both by 
providing a strong basis for the international competitiveness of national 
capital and a favorable environment for foreign direct investment. An 
important distinguishing aspect of this Schumpeterian “workfare” state has 
been “the subordination of social policy to the demands of labor market 
flexibility and structural competitiveness” (Jessop 1993, p. 9) — an 
approach that is fully compatible with the neoliberal critique of the 
Keynesian welfare state of the postwar era. In other words, 
internationalization of the world economy does not entail the disappearance 
of the nation-state but rather its neoliberal transformation.5 
Globalization: Financing nationalism 
Today, neoliberalism’s globalist, end-of-history vision of ‘one big world 
market’ is indeed in crisis and the rise of populisms is indeed a symptom of 
this crisis. But once more we must tread carefully. It is true that the 2008 
crash and the subsequent economic depression did not only put a very 
strong bracket around financialization and securitization, but also 
demonstrated decisively that the nation-state remains to be an 
indispensable actor in governing social reproduction at an international 
                                                 
5 For a recent take on this theme see (Mazzucato 2015). 
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scale. Nevertheless, these assertions need to be qualified. First, the bracket 
around the networks and derivatives of financial capital is yet to be fully 
enacted. Despite riding the populist resentment against Wall Street before 
being elected, the Trump Administration is looking forward to dismantle the 
already timid Dodd-Frank Act (intended to rein in the excesses of finance 
capital) and the speed of financialization and securitization have quickly 
resumed its pre-crisis levels (for an immediate post-crisis view, see 
Dholakia 2011). Yet, there is a widespread agreement that global financial 
markets have become the key sources of risk for the world economy and 
polity — even if this agreement has yet to find the right agency and the 
program to implement its control.  In this regard, it is possible to read left-
wing populism of Bernie Sanders in the US and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK 
as the emergence of a political agency and program with the explicit 
objective of implementing such a control over finance capital —but more on 
this below. 
Second, the internationalized structure of financial markets impose 
significant limits on the effectivity of the monetary policy interventions of the 
central banks (the Fed, the ECB, etc.). For instance, the Fed, while 
intending to inject liquidity to the US economy with “quantitative easing”, 
ended up instead funneling funds towards the emerging financial markets, 
financing economic growth in these mid-range nation-states (not only 
BRICS; but also the so-called MINT, namely Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and 
Turkey; see, e.g., Rodner 2017). And, it is precisely this global financial 
expansion, even after the 2008 crisis, which provided the populist regimes 
across the globe the funds for consolidating their sovereign hold. On the 
one hand, these populist regimes used the capital inflow to finance domestic 
credit expansion. Availability of cheap credit meant for these growing middle 
classes easier access to new commodities and aspired to life-styles. On the 
other, this easy money financed the construction sector (through 
mortgages) as well as the mega infrastructural projects. These construction 
investments did not only soak up some of the unemployment in the low-skill 
end of the labor market but also served an ideological function for projecting 
the grandiosity of the nation-state. The case in point is of course Erdoğan 
and the resilience of his popular support despite his brand of increasingly 
authoritarian populist nationalism. In an ironic twist, therefore, financial 
internationalization became an indispensable condition of possibility of 
populist nationalism.   
In this very practical sense, the very framing of the problem as an 
irreconcilable antinomy between neoliberal internationalism and populist 
nationalism does not hold. Not only is the economic feasibility of populist 
nationalism contingent upon the ceaseless flow of international capital, 
9
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global financial investors are, in turn, hooked on these high-risk high-return 
securities originating from emerging markets. This symbiotic relationship 
between financial capital and authoritarian regimes problematizes another 
doxa of globalism regarding the relation between capitalism and 
democracy. In recent years, an institutionalist literature has argued that 
successful long-run growth performance of an economy is directly 
correlated with the existence of established, stable and strong institutions 
of market economy, namely, competitive markets, secure property rights, 
political competition, and a general sense of rule of law. Nevertheless, the 
increasing internationalization and securitization endows financial capital 
with an unprecedented elasticity and liquidity to adapt itself to the political 
risks associated with authoritarian regimes. At the end of the day, as long 
as there are no restrictions over the movement of financial assets, as long 
as the authoritarian practices of sovereign nation-states do not disrupt the 
financial flows, and as long as the risk premium is properly incorporated into 
the interest rate, there is no reason for international finance not to cooperate 
with authoritarian regimes.   
Yet for all the nations that are plugged into the global financial 
network, the access to finance does not come without a cost. Increased 
securitization and liquidity means increased risk of herd behavior, 
speculative bubble formation (see, e.g., Dholakia and Turcan 2013), and 
sudden and high volume movements of short-term capital. One way to 
make sense of the recent resurgence of populist reactions against global 
finance and peoples’ desire to use the nation-state to protect their 
(imagined) communities is an increasing realization of the vulnerability of 
societies against the violence of finance and capital accumulation (Marazzi 
2011).  
Reactionary nationalism 
As already discussed above, the way the nationalist vernacular is deployed 
and articulated and the social composition of the national populist front 
(which groups are included and which are excluded) will shape the form that 
the self-protection of a society will take. It is perhaps the moment to invoke 
Karl Polanyi’s celebrated notion of “double movement” — but only with the 
proviso that Polanyi himself makes with respect to “fascism” as one of the 
many possible responses to the crises and excess of the “market system” 
(2001 [1944], p. 255). Organized societies, to the extent that they can 
transcend the short-term perspective imposed upon them by economic 
rationality, may develop institutions and mechanisms to contest and limit 
the acephalic movement of the circuits of capital. And, the nation-form has 
historically been quite an effective form in accomplishing this task — until it 
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stopped being so with the neoliberal turn. Today, the desire to return to an 
era before globalization, before neoliberalism, can perhaps be understood 
in this vein. But, the question that needs to be posed, precisely at this 
juncture, is the one Polanyi asked during the Second World War: What will 
be the content of the nation-form that this new populist resurgence deploys 
in order to protect its imagined community? If, as Partha Chatterjee argues, 
Empire, and its “prerogative to declare the colonial exception”, “is certainly 
not dead” (2012, p. 15, 23), then this question cannot be answered without 
considering the imperial hierarchy of nations. This question is even more 
urgent today given all that is evoked by Trump’s election slogan: MAKE 
AMERICA GREAT AGAIN. Writing in 2012, Chatterjee was prescient: 
The asymmetry between the economic troubles of the Western 
powers and their overwhelming military superiority could well open 
the field for populist resurgence of imperialism, not unlike what was 
seen in the late nineteenth century. The economic decline of the 
once privileged is fertile ground for the ugly display of naked power. 
There are signs already of a growing populist politics in the United 
States and Western Europe seeking to defend the global privileges 
of the core body of citizens of these countries against the assertions 
of lesser powers and the intrusions of alien immigrants (2012, p. 21). 
Reading populist resurgence solely from the grid of the forced choice 
outlined above makes it impossible to see the diversity of forms of 
populisms. Every populism, to the extent that they must draw a friend-
enemy line, must take up a position on one side or another of the 
imperialism/anti-imperialism divide (Gökmen 2017). One must tread very 
carefully here, however, as imperialism is not a Manichaean order; there is 
a hierarchy of nations and what appears to be an anti-imperialist nationalism 
from one perspective might as well be fueled by the promises of pecuniary 
as well as symbolic spoils of regional imperialist projections. Once again, 
Erdoğan’s recently found anti-imperialist rhetoric is premised upon the 
defeat of his administration’s very own regional imperialist projections 
regarding the Middle East as well as the increasingly intractable Kurdish 
question as an “international colony” (Beşikçi 2015).  
In lieu of conclusion: Is a trans-local counter-populism 
possible? 
It is in this precise sense, following Balibar’s (2017) formulation, we can 
distinguish between populism and counter-populism. Balibar argues that 
nationalist and imperialist forms of populism across the world appropriate 
and instrumentalize “deep divisions within our societies that neoliberalism 
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has either intensified or generated […] under the terminology of ‘anger’” and 
channel “resentment feelings of insecurity […] aggressively toward 
scapegoats and ‘internal enemies’”. In order to confront these forms of 
populism, Balibar calls for imagining a “transnational counter-populism” that 
does not concede the criticism of “the dispossession or disempowerment of 
the masses in the oligarchic regime” to the imperialist versions of 
nationalist-populism; and that, instead “seeks and requires the 
empowerment of the citizenry, therefore pushing its capacity beyond the 
limits and across the borders that in the past defined the political”.  
It is important to note that Balibar is not calling for a progressive 
populist-nationalism but rather a “transnational counter-populism” — the 
key category being transnational. This new category introduces a further 
complication to our aforementioned antinomies of globalization. Given that 
his own writing and politics have historically been preoccupied with the 
internal as well as external borders of Europe, his choice of “transnational” 
should not come as a surprise. Moreover, the cycle of revolutionary 
upheavals –  from Athens to Tahrir Square, from Plaza del Sol to Wall 
Street, and from Wisconsin to Istanbul’s Gezi – did indeed announce itself 
as a transnational phenomenon. Yet, as this cycle of revolutionary uprising 
against neoliberalism, authoritarianism and their various combinations 
dissipated, the transnational and trans-local nature of this “global crowd” 
(Buck-Morss 2015) was lost and their oppositional energies were culled by 
populist movements that took the nation-form as their container. This 
recoiling back into the shell of the nation-form happened even when these 
movements continued to acknowledge the necessity of maintaining a 
transnational perspective: on the left, Syriza, Podemos, Bernie Sanders and 
most recently, Corbyn’s Labour are all part of the same sequence, even if 
each followed a different path and in some cases lost their nerve 
somewhere along the road.  
The necessity of maintaining a transnational perspective, while 
operating within the political frame of the nation-form and enhancing the 
capabilities of citizens at the local level at the same time is perhaps the most 
important challenge of all these counter-populisms. Trans-nationality or, if 
we do not want to override the regional and the local in the name of the 
national, trans-locality is necessary because the problems that we face are 
transnational and trans-local: The ecological crisis and the crisis of 
capitalism are both global problems that cannot be tackled adequately only 
at the national or the local level — even if all solutions must be built ground 
up, at the level of micro-politics of subjectivity, by contesting the biopolitical 
subjectivities of neoliberal forms of governmentality with equal measure. 
The internal tensions of politics of degrowth illustrates this point perfectly 
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(Kallis, Kerschner and Martinez-Alier 2012). On the one hand, “degrowth” 
is a global, transnational proposition — it requires all the nations to act in a 
coordinated manner even as its actual implementation also recognizes the 
legacy of colonial history and the unevenness of development across 
nations. On the other hand, degrowth is a local, ethico-political proposition 
— it invites everyone to reflect upon the impact of their consumption 
patterns on the ecology as well as to question the types of work-life relations 
cultivated by the neoliberal forms of superego. In between these two poles 
of the global and the local, a politics of degrowth cannot afford to ignore the 
scale of national economy and the institutions and dispositifs of the nation-
state as terrains of legitimate struggle — even if their very constitution has 
historically been premised upon harnessing the powers and benefits of 
modernity in the name of national interest. 
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